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ABSTRACT
Asymmetric schemes belong to second generation of wa-
termarking. Whereas their need and advantage are well
understood, many doubts have been raised about their ro-
bustness. According to a method presented in [1], a very
robust symmetric technique is derived into an asymmetric
scheme. Tests show that it is as robust as the symmetric
version. Yet, asymmetric schemes undergo malicious at-
tacks that confuse the detection process. Tests reveal that
the quality loss due to these malicious attacks is too impor-
tant for the signal to be used after the attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
To build a copy protection system for consumer electronic
devices, we are looking for a technique, which could embed
in an original content a signal commonly called watermark.
Compliant devices such as players or recorders are able to
detect the presence of this watermark. In this particular
case, its presence means that the content is protected and
thus it is illegal to copy it. This embedded watermark must
not be perceptible.
To assess the security of watermarking, we made a
threat analysis of these techniques. Some achieve good re-
sults in non-perceptibility and robustness, and all of them
are symmetric schemes. Symmetric means that the detec-
tion process make use of the parameters used by the em-
bedding process. The knowledge of these parameters allow
pirates to forge illegal contents by modifying or removing
watermark. This set of parameters is called the secrete key
and must be stored safely. This is not possible in consumer
electronics. Tamper proof device is too expensive.
This is the reason why asymmetric watermarking sche-
mes inspired from the cryptography domain have been re-
cently studied ([2], [3] and [1]). They should be as robust
as symmetric techniques with a detector needing a set of
parameters called the public key different from the embed-
ding’s secret key. knowing the public key, it should be nei-
ther possible to deduce the private key nor possible to re-
move the watermark .
In this paper, we choose a symmetric technique achiev-
ing very good results in robustness. According to our me-
thod, we render it asymmetric. The first issue is to test the
derived technique against common image transformations
(for instance, JPEG, filtering, cropping...). The main result
is that this derived technique is as robust as the symmetric
one. The second issue is the vulnerability against mali-
cious attacks. These attacks are specific of the asymmetric
method, but their visual impact depends on the watermark-
ing technique.
2. ALGORITHMS
We describe in this section the algorithms of the symmetric
technique, its derivation into a public key scheme, and its
human perceptual model.
2.1. The symmetric technique
In this subsection, we give the technical details about the
implementation of the symmetric technique invented by
Alessia De Rosa and al.[4]. Its robustness is impressive,
especially with the optimal version of the detector.
From a cover content Co belonging to the “media space”
the extraction function X(.) maps cover data into a vector
in the “watermark space”: ro = X(Co). The “media space”
is the spatial domain. X(.) orders in a vector ro a subset of
the magnitude of N discrete Fourier transform coefficients
of Co. These coefficients are extracted between the k-th
and the (k + n)-th diagonal in the first quadrant and their
symmetrical images in the second quadrant [4]. They are
ordered in a pseudo random manner, so that we can assume
the sequence {ro[m]} is a white stationary process.
The role of the “mixing function” f(.) is to modify the
extracted vector ro into a vector rw which is sufficiently
similar to the watermark signal w: rw = f(ro, w). In this
paper, it modifies the amplitude of the DFT coefficients
store in ro proportionally to their value:
rw [m] = ro[m].(1 + γ.w[m]) ∀m ∈ [0..N − 1]
where γ > 0 fixes the embedding depth. If w[m] < −1
γ
,
then rw [m] is clipped to 0.
The application of the “inverse extraction” function
Y (.) concludes the embedding process. It maps back from
the “watermark space” to the “media space”:
Cw = Y (rw , Co). Here, Y (.) copies the DFT coefficients of
Co and changes the amplitude of those used at the extrac-
tion according to the watermarked vector rw .
2.2. The asymmetric version
In [1], we described a method allowing to derive an asym-
metric technique from classical spread spectrum ones. The
detection process does not compare the extracted signal ru
to a specific signal w, but checks if ru has a specific sta-
tistical property due to the presence of w. Under several
conditions, one can even demonstrate that it is not possible
to estimate it from rw. In this asymmetric scheme, the sig-
nal w is a filtered Gaussian central white noise v with unity
variance:
rw = f(ro, (h⊗ v))
The normalized filter h and the signal v are private param-
eters.
The detection process does not need these private pa-
rameters, but it needs the amplitude of the frequency re-
sponse of the filter h. This public parameter |H(f)| char-
acterizes the expected statistical property: the spectrum of
ru is shaped by |H(f)|2. A simple hypothesis test decides
to which hypothesis the unknown content Cu is more likely
to belong:
• H0: The extracted signal ru is not watermarked, so
it does not share this specific statistical property: Its es-
timated spectrum g0(f) is flat (we assumed that ro is a
white stationary processes). g0(f) = σ
2
ru + µ
2
ru .δ(f) where
µru and σ
2
ru are the mean and the variance of the tested
extracted signal ru.
• H1: The extracted signal ru has been watermarked.
The following relations hold:
ϕru [l] = E(ru[m].ru[m+ l]) = ϕro [l] + γ
2.ϕro [l].ϕw[l]
g1(f) = Φro(f) + γ
2.Φro(f) ⊗Φw(f)
E(.) is the mathematical expectation, ϕro [.] the correlation
function of the sequence {ro[m]} and Φro(f) its Fourier
transform, which is the power spectral density of this se-
quence. We make the assumption that the sequences {ro[m]}
and {w[m]} are statistically independent. Here again,
Φro(f) = σ
2
ro + µ
2
ro .δ(f). Because w = h ⊗ v, Φw(f) =
|H(f)|2. The filter h is normalized so that   |H(f)|2 .df = 1.
Finally, the power spectral density expected if H1 is true,
is:
g1(f) = σ
2
ro + µ
2
ro .δ(f) + γ
2.(µ2ro . |H(f)|2 + σ2ro)
= µ2ru .δ(f) + σ
2
ru + γ
2.µ2ru .(|H(f)|2 − 1)
The critical region R′(|H(f)|2) is the set of extracted
vector of the “watermark space” sharing this specific sta-
tistical property. It depends only on the public parameter,
and can be defined as follows:
R′(|H(f)|2) = {ru|U(ru, g0) − U(ru, g1) ≥ Thr′}
where U(ru, gi) is the Whittle’s principal part of the likeli-
hood that the spectrum of the random process ru matches
the power spectral density gi(f). Its simplified expression
is U(ru, gi) = 2N
 
1
2
− 12
(log(gi(f)) + IN(f)/gi(f)).df where
IN (f) is the periodogram of the sequence ru: IN (f) =


 
N−1
k=0 ru(k).e
2piikf



2
∀f ∈]− 12 , 12 ].
2.3. Human perception model
Up to now, the watermark’s invisibility issue is only tack-
led by the embedding depth γ. But, this action is very
limited because the watermark signal, once mapped in the
media space, is spread all over the image. Uniform areas of
the image are very sensitive to watermark addition so they
only support extremely small embedding depth γ, whereas
edge areas, for instance, support deeper watermark addi-
tion. This issue leads to a spatial domain based human
perceptual model giving the amount of noise each pixel can
support. We selected the human perception model proposed
by Bartolini and al. [5]. This empirical human perception
model, gives good experimental results. It is based on the
computation of the variance of the 9 × 9 windowed signal
and by normalizing the obtained arrays with respect to its
maximum value. Thus, ∀(x, y) 0 ≤ M(x, y) ≤ 1. Finally,
the watermarked content is given by a new inverse extrac-
tion function Y ′(.):
Cw = Y
′(rw, Co) = (1 −M).Co + M.Y (rw, Co)
This choice allows us to compare the symmetric technique
[4] and its asymmetric version because we share exactly the
same condition of experiments. We simply model the influ-
ence of this masking function putting γ = γ
 l,cM(l, c)/N
2
in place of γ in g1(f).
3. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS
Co is the 512 ∗ 512 pixels image “Lena”. For each test, It
has been watermarked several times with different random
permutations ordering DFT coefficients in ro. The average
performances are given here. Parameters are set to n =
72, k = 78, γ = 0.22
3.1. Common transformations
3.1.1. JPEG Compression
The quality factor Q of the JPEG compression scheme va-
ries from 100% to 0%. Detector’s response is normalized so
that for Q = 100%, its response is set to 1. Fig. 1 plots
averaged results to a quality factor from 0% to 30%. Detec-
tion performs well until Q = 5%. The symmetric technique
robustness quality factor were Q = 5% with a correlation
detector and Q = 3% with the optimum decoding1 .
3.2. Malicious attacks
The pirate knows exactly the detection process, especially
what the detector is looking for. So, he can forge a pirated
content Cp that the detector does not classify as water-
marked. The asymmetric technique is robust to these mali-
cious attacks if the quality of pirated contents is so poor that
they have no commercial value. J. Eggers and B. Girod in-
troduced in [3] the measure D = D(Co,Cp)
D(Co,Cw)
, where D(B,C)
represents a perceptual distance between two contents B
and C. The greater D is, the more robust the technique is.
We assume D(B,C) to be the Euclidean distance between
1Test on filtering, cropping and noise addition are detailed in
the full paper.
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Figure 1: Robustness against JPEG
the two vectors B and C in the “media space”. Thanks
to Parseval’s theorem, in our case, D(B,C) = d(rB , rC)/M
with d(rB, rC) the Euclidean distance between the two vec-
tors rB and rC in the “watermark space”.
3.2.1. Adding filtered noise
The strategy of the pirate here2 is to whiten the sequence
rw adding a filtered noise rn to it: rp[m] = rw [m]+rn[m] =
ro[m]∗(1+γ.w[m])+η.(h′⊗v′)[m]. The expected spectrum
of rp is then
Φrp (f) = µ
2
ruδ(f) + σ
2
ru + γ
2µ2ru(|H(f)|2 − 1) + η2  H ′(f)  2
The pirate achieves is goal if Φrp(f) looks like g0(f).
This means γ2µ2ru |H(f)|2 + η2 |H ′(f)|2 = σ2P ∀f ∈]− 12 , 12 ]˙.
The minimum value for σ2P is γ
2µ2ru max(|H(f)|2). This
defines the following parameters.
η2 ∗ 

H ′(f) 

2
= (γµru)
2 (max(|H(f)|2)− |H(f)|2)
The pirate creates a filter h′ which matches the required
spectrum |H ′(f)|2. The Egger’s measure is then:
D = ‖γ.diag(ro).w + η(h
′ ⊗ v′)‖2
‖γ.diag(ro).w‖2
= max(|H(f)|2)
This gives us a clue how to design the filter h. We must
maximizeD choosing h as selective as possible. View Fig.(3.2.1)
to assess quality loss.
4. CONCLUSION
The high performances against classical image transforma-
tions are mainly due to the implementation layout, espe-
cially the design of the extraction function X(.). The deriva-
tion into an asymmetric technique does not spoil these per-
formances. We also achieved a fair robustness against mali-
cious attacks especially designed for this asymmetric method.
2Malicious attack by re-filtering is also presented in the final
paper.
Figure 2: forged content by malicious attack
This performance highly depends on the design of the filter
h. This paper brings credits to the feasibility of asymmetric
techniques.
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